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Introduction	  	  If	  human	  societies	  are	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  by	  reducing	  greenhouse	  gas	  emis-­‐sions,	  they	  must	  better	  understand	  the	  pathways	  by	  which	  transformative	  technologies	  be-­‐come	  significant	  components	  of	  mainstream	  energy	  systems.	  Transformational	  change	  in	  the	  world’s	  energy	  system,	  as	  well	  as	  associated	  systems	  such	  as	  agriculture	  and	  land	  use,	  will	  be	  required	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Clarke,	  Weyant,	  and	  Edmonds	  2008;	  Clarke,	  Weyant,	  and	  Birky	  2006;	  Hultman,	  Koomey,	  and	  Kammen	  2007).	  Scenarios	  for	  stabilization	  developed	  through	  the	  U.S.	  Climate	  Change	  Science	  Program	  (Clarke	  et	  al.	  2007)	  show	  that	  energy	  emissions	  from	  freely	  emitting	  fossil	  fuels	  must	  eventually	  ap-­‐proach	  zero	  in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  atmospheric	  CO2	  concentrations.	  Current	  scenarios	  sug-­‐gest	  that	  this	  stabilization	  will	  require	  the	  accelerated	  and	  widespread	  global	  deployment	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  non-­‐emitting	  and	  low-­‐carbon	  energy	  technologies.	  Technological	  transformation	  is	  the	  core	  of	  long	  term	  reductions	  in	  energy-­‐related	  emissions,	  and	  	  many	  controversies	  surrounding	  how	  to	  structure	  climate	  change	  mitiga-­‐tion	  and	  adaptation	  policies–	  including	  financing,	  what	  counts	  as	  action,	  and	  how	  to	  meas-­‐ure	  progress	  against	  uncertain	  goals	  –	  	  are	  based	  on	  differing	  assumptions	  about	  the	  poten-­‐tial	  and	  likely	  pathways	  for	  technological	  change	  (Prins	  et	  al.	  2010).	  The	  central	  questions	  therefore	  revolve	  around	  the	  scope	  of	  policy	  to	  influence	  or	  accelerate	  the	  diffusion	  of	  cli-­‐mate-­‐change-­‐related	  technology	  (Holdren	  2006).	  Arguments	  for	  pricing	  emissions	  cor-­‐rectly	  are	  unfortunately	  insufficient	  in	  a	  world	  where	  markets	  are	  at	  best	  imperfect	  and	  equitable	  well-­‐being	  is	  as	  much	  a	  goal	  as	  efficiency	  (Hultman	  et	  al.	  In	  Press),	  Therefore,	  while	  it	  is	  undoubtedly	  essential	  to	  understand	  the	  market	  forces	  that	  influence	  technology	  development	  and	  deployment—and	  to	  nurture	  our	  capability	  to	  model	  the	  short-­‐term	  mac-­‐roeconomic	  impact	  of	  specific	  carbon	  and	  energy	  policies,	  understanding	  longer-­‐term,	  large-­‐scale	  changes	  in	  the	  energy	  system	  requires	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  the	  relative	  influence	  institutional,	  behavioral,	  and	  social	  factors.	  For	  example,	  changes	  can	  be	  under-­‐stood	  to	  stem	  from	  government	  regulation	  and	  policy,	  differences	  in	  firm	  expertise	  and	  in-­‐frastructure,	  international	  and	  national	  needs	  for	  security,	  innovation	  networks,	  or	  leader-­‐ship.	  Other	  factors	  sometimes	  mentioned	  in	  the	  literature	  include	  the	  availability	  of	  techni-­‐cal	  expertise,	  risk-­‐taking	  behavior	  in	  partners	  and	  suppliers,	  co-­‐benefits	  such	  as	  employ-­‐ment	  in	  declining	  sectors	  or	  increased	  national	  standing,	  the	  origin	  and	  method	  of	  capital	  infusion,	  an	  evolving	  or	  permissive	  regulatory	  structure,	  development	  of	  diversified	  mar-­‐kets,	  standardization	  of	  parts	  and	  systems,	  and	  public	  acceptance.	  	  The	  case	  can	  inevitably	  be	  made	  that	  each	  of	  these	  is	  important	  in	  specific	  circum-­‐stances,	  and	  influence	  of	  such	  factors	  have	  been	  studied	  disparately	  in	  the	  literature	  (Montalvo	  2008).	  Nevertheless,	  a	  question	  remains	  as	  to	  whether	  any	  of	  these	  non-­‐economic	  factors	  is	  highly	  influential	  (or	  even	  determinative)	  across	  technologies	  or	  coun-­‐try	  situations.	  	  This	  paper	  presents	  an	  interview-­‐based	  comparative	  case	  approach	  to	  in-­‐
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vestigating	  systematically	  these	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  these	  non-­‐economic	  factors	  in-­‐fluencing	  technological	  change	  across	  technology	  and	  country	  contexts.	  We	  identified	  two	  low-­‐carbon	  energy	  sectors	  (bioenergy	  and	  civilian	  nuclear	  power)	  that	  witnessed	  dramatic	  changes	  over	  the	  past	  fifty	  years	  in	  the	  energy	  portfolio	  of	  three	  countries:	  Sweden,	  Brazil,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  We	  set	  out	  to	  identify	  which	  of	  many	  possible	  non-­‐economic	  factors	  were	  seen	  by	  sector	  participants	  as	  being	  determinative	  or	  highly	  influential	  in	  the	  trajec-­‐tory	  of	  that	  technology	  in	  their	  country	  context.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  present	  findings	  from	  41	  interviews	  across	  four	  cases:	  Nuclear	  in	  Sweden/US,	  and	  Bioenergy	  in	  Sweden/Brazil.	  	  	  
Background	  	  Research	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  technological	  transformation	  has	  drawn	  on	  con-­‐structs	  such	  as	  the	  classic	  Schumpeterian	  creative	  destruction	  theory	  (Schumpeter	  1934[1974]),	  long-­‐wave	  cycles	  of	  change,	  the	  S-­‐shaped	  learning	  curve	  (beginning	  with	  Wright	  1936),	  and	  the	  S-­‐shaped	  diffusion	  curve	  (starting	  with	  Gabriel	  Tarde’s	  work	  in	  1903).	  Case	  studies	  such	  as	  Hughes’	  (1985)	  history	  of	  electrification	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Britain,	  and	  Germany;	  or	  Dobbin’s	  (1994)	  study	  of	  railway	  introduction	  and	  expansion	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  France	  document	  these	  large	  shifts	  in	  technological	  systems	  (see	  Rip	  and	  Kemp	  1998	  for	  a	  review).	  	  Yet	  these	  descriptive	  studies	  are	  of	  limited	  prospective	  help	  in	  planning	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  technological	  transformations	  needed	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change	  emissions	  in	  the	  energy	  sector.	  For	  instance,	  the	  S-­‐shaped	  diffusion	  curve	  has	  been	  validated	  in	  many	  studies	  of	  technological	  change,	  but	  it	  merely	  describes	  the	  phenomenon	  by	  which	  first	  a	  few,	  then	  many,	  then	  a	  final	  few	  adopt	  a	  given	  technology.	  As	  Grübler	  (Grübler	  1997)	  and	  others	  have	  pointed	  out,	  the	  rate	  and	  total	  time	  of	  change	  cannot	  be	  specified	  prospectively;	  neither	  does	  the	  curve	  explain	  why	  diffusion	  is	  taking	  place.	  Schumpeter’s	  entrepreneur	  spear-­‐heads	  new	  “combinations”	  that	  drive	  technological	  change,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  know	  why	  one	  entrepreneur	  succeeds	  and	  another	  fails.	  	  More	  revealing	  are	  studies	  of	  successful	  entrepreneurs,	  such	  as	  Thomas	  Edison,	  who	  was	  able	  not	  only	  to	  invent	  but	  also	  to	  find	  financial	  backers,	  persuade	  governments	  to	  set	  up	  enabling	  policy	  environments,	  and	  attract	  a	  host	  of	  secondary	  inventors	  and	  suppliers	  who	  provided	  continuous	  improvements	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Hughes	  1985,	  Stokes	  1997).	  However,	  the	  individual	  case	  study	  as	  an	  historical	  analysis,	  while	  demonstrating	  contingency	  and	  complexity,	  often	  makes	  no	  attempt	  to	  generalize	  or	  to	  provide	  prospective	  guidance.	  Moreover,	  the	  principal	  role	  allotted	  to	  the	  inventor-­‐as-­‐hero	  obscures	  driving	  elements	  that	  may	  be	  provided	  in	  other	  ways	  in	  other	  situations,	  such	  as	  transformations	  where	  there	  is	  no	  dominant	  actor.	  Often	  associated	  or	  conflated	  with	  research	  on	  technological	  diffusion	  are	  studies	  of	  the	  contribution	  of	  R&D	  to	  technological	  innovation	  and	  on	  the	  sources	  of	  innovation	  gen-­‐erally.	  Beginning	  with	  Vannevar	  Bush’s	  conviction	  that	  the	  scientific	  enterprise	  was	  a	  vast	  storehouse	  from	  which	  endless	  technological	  innovations	  could	  flow	  (Bush	  1945),	  this	  line	  of	  research	  has	  connected	  scientific	  research	  with	  U.S.	  world	  leadership	  in	  innovation,	  ris-­‐ing	  GDP,	  and	  military	  dominance.	  This	  in	  turn	  has	  led	  to	  examining	  the	  factors	  that	  foster	  innovation	  in	  organizations	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Altschuller	  1999,	  Burgelman	  et	  al.	  1996,	  Drucker	  1993,	  Hamel	  2000,	  Light	  1998).	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The	  immense	  challenge	  of	  climate	  change	  has	  prompted	  calls	  for	  emissions	  mitigation	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  new	  “Manhattan	  Project”	  or	  “Apollo	  Project.”	  However,	  the	  analogy	  to	  these	  past,	  successful	  large	  technology	  projects	  is	  not	  necessarily	  illuminating.	  As	  Prins	  and	  Rayner	  (Prins	  and	  Rayner	  2007)	  have	  pointed	  out,	  these	  focused	  and	  heroic	  projects	  were	  able	  to	  be	  successful	  because	  they	  had	  clear	  goals	  and	  end	  points;	  they	  were,	  in	  the	  authors’	  words,	  “tame”	  problems.	  Climate	  change,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  a	  “wicked”	  problem,	  that	  is,	  a	  prob-­‐lem	  in	  which	  lack	  of	  understanding	  is	  endemic	  because	  so	  many	  open-­‐ended	  systems	  are	  involved.	  Many	  literatures	  inform	  our	  understanding	  of	  R&D	  and	  other	  sources	  of	  innovation	  but	  they	  tell	  us	  little	  about	  how	  the	  diffusion	  process	  begins,	  accelerates,	  and	  succeeds	  or	  fails.	  More	  specialized	  literatures	  such	  as	  the	  Social	  History	  of	  Technology,	  Science	  and	  Technol-­‐ogy	  Studies,	  the	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Technology,	  and	  Actor-­‐Network	  Theory,	  while	  also	  focusing	  on	  case	  studies,	  also	  have	  begun	  to	  develop	  theories	  about	  technology	  diffusion,	  many	  of	  them	  related	  to	  different	  dimensions	  of	  governance.	  Latour’s	  (1984[1987])	  well-­‐known	  study	  about	  the	  diffusion	  of	  Pasteur’s	  ideas	  demonstrates	  that	  creating	  an	  innova-­‐tion	  is	  just	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  process.	  Pasteur	  then	  engaged	  in	  extensive	  effort	  of	  creat-­‐ing	  “order	  at	  all	  points”;	  he	  “did	  not	  just	  send	  results	  out	  from	  his	  lab;	  he	  engaged	  in	  a	  pro-­‐longed	  program	  to	  convince	  farmers,	  vintners,	  hygienists,	  hospitals,	  and	  so	  forth,	  that	  he	  was	  acting	  in	  their	  interests,	  and	  that	  they	  ought	  to	  incorporate	  elements	  of	  his	  laboratory	  regime	  into	  their	  ways	  of	  life”	  (Jasanoff	  and	  Wynne	  1998).	  Similarly,	  Hughes’	  study	  of	  elec-­‐trification	  includes	  lengthy	  descriptions	  of	  persuasion	  and	  institution-­‐building.	  Callon’s	  (1997)	  actor-­‐network	  examination	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  electric	  car	  in	  France	  demonstrates	  that	  government	  policy,	  technical	  and	  manufacturing	  expertise,	  and	  resources	  can	  be	  sty-­‐mied	  when	  research	  does	  not	  produced	  expected	  breakthroughs.	  	  
Methods	  
	  We	  sought	  to	  establish	  the	  primary	  factors	  influencing	  significant	  energy	  technology	  transformation	  across	  country	  and	  technology	  contexts.	  	  Our	  methods	  entailed	  selecting	  cases,	  conducting	  interviews	  and	  with	  key	  experts	  in	  each	  case	  context,	  and	  analyzing	  in-­‐terview	  data	  both	  qualitatively	  and	  quantitatively.	  We	  chose	  two	  technology	  classes—bioenergy	  and	  nuclear	  power—across	  three	  countries:	  the	  United	  States,	  Sweden,	  and	  Bra-­‐zil.	  	  Collectively,	  these	  countries	  exhibit	  similarities	  in	  their	  respective	  patterns	  of	  energy	  technology	  (non)	  adoption,	  and	  thus	  offer	  a	  useful	  and	  valid	  sample	  for	  analysis	  and	  gener-­‐alization	  of	  results.	  Ethanol	  has	  attracted	  renewed	  attention	  as	  a	  potentially	  renewable	  transportation	  fuel,	  although	  controversy	  surrounds	  its	  net	  environmental	  impact	  and	  energy	  balance	  (Pimen-­‐tel	  and	  Patzek,	  2005;	  Shapouri	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Runge	  and	  Senauer,	  2007)	  (Farrell	  et	  al.	  2006).	  Each	  of	  the	  country	  cases	  illustrates	  efforts	  to	  adopt	  and	  diffuse	  ethanol	  as	  a	  major	  element	  of	  the	  transportation	  fuel	  mix	  and	  each	  focuses	  on	  factors	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  necessary	  elements	  of	  successful	  technology	  diffusion	  (see	  Malone	  2004	  and	  Dooley	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  In	  studies	  of	  ethanol	  adoption	  in	  Brazil,	  Sweden,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  and	  of	  the	  use	  of	  biomass	  from	  forest	  wastes	  for	  heat	  and	  power	  production	  in	  Sweden,	  we	  hypothe-­‐sized	  several	  important	  variables,	  including	  policies	  giving	  preferential	  treatment	  to	  bio-­‐energy-­‐related	  technologies,	  government-­‐industry	  relations,	  the	  role	  of	  technological	  inno-­‐
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vation,	  relevant	  domestic	  natural	  resources	  and	  feedstocks,	  and	  perceptions	  of	  technology	  risk	  on	  the	  part	  of	  key	  stakeholders.	  While	  these	  and	  many	  other	  variables	  are	  influential	  in	  the	  successful	  adoption	  and	  dif-­‐fusion	  of	  new	  energy	  technologies,	  the	  bioenergy	  cases	  discussed	  here	  offer	  particularly	  valuable	  studies	  of	  the	  interplay	  of	  technological	  and	  natural	  resource	  variables.	  	  The	  avail-­‐ability	  of	  sufficient	  domestic	  supplies	  of	  high	  quality	  (i.e.,	  energy	  dense	  and	  economically	  convertible)	  feedstocks	  for	  ethanol	  production	  and	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  of	  conversion	  tech-­‐nologies	  may	  be	  more	  decisive	  than	  other	  variables	  in	  determining	  success	  or	  failure.	  	  	  	  	  	  Rising	  and	  volatile	  petroleum	  prices,	  geopolitical	  conflicts	  in	  fossil-­‐fuel	  rich	  regions,	  in-­‐creasing	  energy	  demand	  from	  emerging	  economies,	  and	  climate	  change	  have	  all	  contrib-­‐uted	  to	  a	  resurgence	  of	  interest	  in	  nuclear	  power	  based	  on	  its	  potential	  to	  address	  energy	  security	  without	  emitting	  carbon	  dioxide	  or	  regional	  pollutants	  (Sailor	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Rothwell	  2006;	  Bokenkamp	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Rothwell	  2000;	  Reedman,	  Graham,	  and	  Coombes	  2006).	  	  Past	  experience	  with	  such	  large-­‐scale	  technological	  ventures	  highlights	  linked	  policy,	  cul-­‐tural,	  and	  economic	  challenges,	  some	  of	  which	  may	  not	  be	  amenable	  to	  technological	  solu-­‐tion	  (La	  Porte	  1994).	  As	  a	  source	  of	  electricity	  that	  could,	  from	  a	  technical	  standpoint,	  pro-­‐vide	  a	  substitute	  for	  large,	  centrally	  sited,	  baseload	  coal-­‐fired	  power,	  nuclear	  power	  can	  be	  a	  significant	  possible	  contributor	  to	  reducing	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	  Nevertheless,	  var-­‐ied	  experiences	  with	  nuclear	  power	  underscore	  the	  relatively	  minor	  role	  that	  technical	  fea-­‐sibility	  and	  technological	  elegance	  has	  within	  the	  wider	  social	  matrix.	  Interrelated	  prob-­‐lems	  of	  spiraling	  costs,	  government	  policy,	  and	  public	  opposition	  led	  to	  a	  virtual	  morato-­‐rium	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  nuclear	  technology	  that	  is	  only	  now	  lifting.	  Re-­‐examining	  this	  telling	  experience	  in	  nuclear	  deployment	  provides	  a	  sound	  compari-­‐son	  to	  the	  ethanol	  case.	  Nuclear	  power	  experienced	  a	  contentious	  history	  and	  cost	  escala-­‐tion	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Koomey	  and	  Hultman	  2007)	  which	  led	  to	  a	  long	  period	  of	  uncer-­‐tainty	  in	  the	  industry	  (Hultman	  and	  Koomey	  2007)	  Sweden	  has	  had	  a	  mixed	  experience	  varied	  with	  nuclear	  power.	  After	  a	  long	  period	  of	  public	  acceptance	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  in	  the	  1990s	  voters	  elected	  to	  phase	  out	  all	  nuclear	  power	  by	  2000;	  this	  policy	  was	  then	  reversed,	  and	  reversed	  again,	  and	  now	  Sweden	  retains	  a	  commitment	  to	  become	  nuclear-­‐free.	  Brazil	  provides	  an	  interesting	  foil	  	  to	  Sweden:	  like	  Sweden,	  it	  began	  developing	  a	  domestic	  nu-­‐clear	  industry	  and	  continues	  to	  run	  one	  commercial	  reactor,	  but	  unlike	  Sweden	  it	  did	  not	  develop	  a	  large-­‐scale	  commercial	  nuclear	  power	  industry	  and	  therefore	  may	  offer	  some	  insights	  into	  additional	  non-­‐economic	  barriers	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  this	  	  technology.	  Together,	  the	  two	  technologies	  across	  three	  countries	  comprise	  six	  research	  compari-­‐sons	  (Brazil-­‐Nuclear,	  Brazil-­‐Bioenergy,	  Sweden-­‐Nuclear,	  Sweden-­‐Bioenergy,	  U.S.-­‐Nuclear,	  U.S.-­‐Bioenergy).	  	  For	  each	  comparison,	  the	  team	  selected	  12-­‐20	  interviewees	  from	  four	  general	  categories:	  government	  officials	  and	  policymakers,	  industry	  managers,	  researchers,	  and	  market/industry	  analysts.	  The	  team	  conducted	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  that	  began	  with	  an	  open-­‐ended	  question	  asking	  what	  factors	  the	  interviewee	  considered	  important	  in	  the	  development	  of	  nuclear	  power	  or	  bioenergy	  in	  his	  or	  her	  country.	  Then	  interviewees	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  set	  of	  nine	  cards,	  each	  of	  which	  described	  a	  factor	  derived	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  technological	  transformation.	  These	  factors	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  1	  and	  also	  de-­‐scribed	  more	  fully	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  assign	  weights	  to	  the	  factors	  they	  consider	  most	  important	  in	  the	  diffusion	  process	  for	  the	  technology.	  In	  some	  inter-­‐views,	  interviewees	  were	  asked	  to	  sort	  the	  cards	  into	  three	  categories:	  determinative	  (i.e.,	  absolutely	  essential	  to	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  technology),	  important	  (but	  not	  determinative),	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and	  not	  important.	  For	  this	  paper,	  we	  report	  on	  the	  results	  from	  a	  collection	  of	  41	  inter-­‐views1	  conducted	  in	  Sweden,	  Brazil,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  from	  March	  2009	  through	  Sep-­‐tember	  2010.	  	  
Results:	  Narrative	  Responses	  	  In	  their	  narrative	  answers	  to	  the	  open-­‐ended	  question,	  “What	  factors	  do	  you	  view	  as	  most	  important	  in	  the	  development	  of	  [Nuclear	  Power	  /	  Bioenergy]	  in	  [Bra-­‐zil/Sweden/United	  States]?”,	  interviewees	  in	  both	  Sweden	  and	  Brazil	  told	  similar	  stories	  about	  how	  nuclear	  and	  biofuels	  technologies	  became	  major	  players	  (e.g.,	  nuclear	  and	  bio-­‐mass	  in	  Sweden,	  ethanol	  in	  Brazil)	  or	  negligible/minor	  contributors	  to	  the	  energy	  sector	  (biofuels	  in	  Sweden,	  nuclear	  in	  Brazil).	  	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  narratives	  diverge	  some-­‐what	  –	  not	  in	  the	  factors	  themselves,	  considered	  as	  a	  set,	  but	  in	  the	  emphases	  and	  details	  given	  by	  individual	  interviewees.	  We	  present	  four	  narratives	  in	  this	  paper:	  Biomass	  in	  Sweden/Ethanol	  in	  Brazil	  and	  Nuclear	  in	  Sweden	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
a.	  Brazilian	  Ethanol:	  Narrative	  Responses	  
	  
Oil	  Crisis	  &	  Proalcool	  Program	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  1973	  Oil	  Crisis,	  approximately	  80%	  of	  Brazil’s	  oil	  was	  imported.	  When	  oil	  prices	  increased,	  the	  import	  bill	  increased	  from	  500	  million	  to	  4	  billion	  dollars,	  which	  drastically	  worsened	  Brazil’s	  trade	  balance.	  The	  1975	  Proalcool	  Program,	  which	  was	  a	  revision	  of	  an	  earlier	  ethanol	  program,	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  both	  energy	  and	  eco-­‐nomic	  problems,	  gave	  new	  economic	  life	  to	  the	  floundering	  domestic	  sugarcane	  industry,	  and	  addressed	  regional	  imbalances	  with	  movement	  to	  the	  interior	  and	  rural	  development.	  	  The	  technology	  was	  available;	  sugarcane	  mills	  were	  upgraded	  to	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  ethanol	  as	  some	  distilleries	  already	  could	  produce	  sugar	  and	  ethanol.	  Further,	  since	  the	  1931	  blend	  mandate,	  car	  engines	  could	  also	  run	  on	  ethanol	  up	  to	  certain	  levels.	  Institu-­‐tional	  support	  and	  memory	  came	  from	  the	  Institute	  of	  Sugar	  and	  Alcohol	  (IAA),	  which	  had	  been	  created	  to	  control	  mill	  quotas	  for	  sugar	  and	  ethanol,	  as	  well	  as	  quantities	  of	  exports	  and	  prices.	  Complementing	  mill	  adaptation,	  the	  IAA	  also	  facilitated	  partnerships	  between	  the	  private	  sugar	  plantations,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  mill	  equipment	  manufacturers,	  like	  Ded-­‐ini,	  which	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  boom	  of	  over	  100	  new	  mills	  in	  the1970s.	  However,	  the	  firm	  structure	  or	  corporate	  culture	  of	  the	  older	  sugarcane	  mills	  was	  not	  conducive	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  ethanol.	  Many	  of	  the	  cane	  plantations	  were	  traditionally	  run	  by	  families	  and	  were	  not	  used	  to	  the	  new	  technologies,	  management,	  or	  labor	  relations.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Of	  these,	  36	  were	  included	  in	  the	  data	  analysis	  below,	  and	  5	  were	  considered	  “context	  in-­‐terviews”	  because	  participants	  either	  were	  not	  prompted	  or	  did	  not	  give	  complete	  answers	  to	  the	  factor	  questions	  in	  the	  interview	  protocol.	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Table	  1.	  Nine	  possible	  factors	  driving	  technological	  change.	  Factors	  were	  derived	   from	  the	   literature	  and	  presented	  to	   interviewees	   for	  prioritization	  after	  open-­‐ended	  questions.	  Factors	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  orthogonal	  or	  mutu-­‐ally	  exclusive	  but	  rather	  were	  established	  to	  cover	  different	  potential	  partici-­‐pant	   perspectives	   on	   the	   transformative	   drivers	   in	   the	   technology/country	  context	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The	  Proalcool	  program	  supported	  the	  ethanol	  industry	  through	  quotas	  and	  price	  floors	  and	  ceilings.	  Consumers	  were	  guaranteed	  not	  to	  pay	  more	  than	  65%	  of	  gasoline	  price	  at	  the	  pump,	  which	  created	  an	  incentive	  for	  production.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  were	  tax	  incen-­‐tives	  for	  the	  production	  of	  pure	  ethanol	  cars,	  or	  E100,	  engines.	  In	  addition,	  all	  fuel	  stations	  in	  Brazil	  were	  required	  to	  have	  at	  least	  one	  ethanol	  pump,	  so	  consumers	  knew	  they	  could	  refuel.	  Further,	  only	  ethanol	  pumps	  were	  open	  on	  weekends.	  Also,	  banks	  were	  only	  al-­‐lowed	  to	  provide	  financing	  to	  consumers	  for	  E100	  vehicles,	  and	  taxes	  were	  higher	  on	  gaso-­‐line-­‐fueled	  cars.	  In	  addition,	  freight	  subsidies	  were	  given	  to	  the	  transportation	  of	  ethanol	  and	  there	  was	  a	  mandatory	  ethanol	  blend	  with	  gasoline,	  which	  started	  at	  5%	  and	  increased	  to	  a	  current	  20-­‐25%	  blend	  level.	  	  In	  addition,	  Brazil	  dominated	  sugarcane	  technology	  and	  products,	  which	  meant	  that	  it	  did	  not	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  external	  knowledge.	  Support	  went	  also	  to	  research	  in	  developing	  high-­‐yield	  cane	  varieties	  and	  improving	  ethanol	  fueled	  engines.	  The	  sugarcane	  mills	  were	  very	  open	  to	  new	  developments	  and	  shared	  knowledge	  and	  technologies.	  Mill	  consultants	  also	  played	  an	  active	  role	  in	  transmitting	  technology	  to	  mills	  and	  improved	  mill	  production	  processes.	  Finally,	  equipment	  manufacturers	  Dedini	  and	  Zenini	  also	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  ethanol	  production.	  	  
	  
Economic	  Deregulation	  and	  Ethanol	  Decline	  Three	  factors	  reduced	  the	  ethanol	  market:	  reduced	  oil	  prices,	  increased	  sugar	  prices,	  and	  reduced	  government	  support.	  During	  the	  1980s,	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  fell,	  and	  ethanol	  be-­‐came	  less	  competitive	  with	  gas.	  In	  addition,	  the	  new	  constitution	  of	  1988	  started	  to	  liberal-­‐ize	  and	  reduce	  government	  involvement	  in	  the	  economy,	  funds	  for	  the	  Proalcool	  program	  ceased	  in	  1989,	  and	  IAA	  was	  dissolved.	  Further,	  sugar	  mills	  began	  to	  export	  sugar,	  realizing	  higher	  sugar	  prices	  in	  the	  international	  market.	  Consumers	  began	  to	  have	  difficulty	  in	  ob-­‐taining	  ethanol,	  so	  demand	  for	  E100	  cars	  decreased	  and	  automobile	  manufacturers	  pro-­‐duced	  fewer	  of	  them.	  By	  2000,	  E100	  cars	  were	  only	  available	  by	  special	  request.	  Many	  mills	  went	  bankrupt,	  and	  inefficient	  mills	  were	  closed	  or	  consolidated.	  In	  addition,	  the	  national	  oil	  company,	  Petrobras,	  had	  succeeded	  in	  finding	  oil	  off	  the	  coast,	  so	  the	  energy	  question	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  so	  pressing	  to	  the	  government.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Flex	  Fuel	  Engine:	  The	  Second	  Ethanol	  Expansion	  &	  the	  Current	  Ethanol	  Market	  The	  second	  ethanol	  movement	  was	  initiated	  almost	  entirely	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  via	  the	  development	  of	  flex	  fuel	  engines,	  which	  brought	  stable	  ethanol	  demand	  to	  the	  market	  and	  supported	  a	  solid	  integration	  of	  ethanol	  into	  the	  fuel	  market.	  In	  addition,	  the	  govern-­‐ment	  set	  the	  price	  for	  ethanol,	  and	  research	  had	  dramatically	  improved	  production	  so	  that	  the	  ethanol	  price	  was	  competitive	  with	  gasoline.	  Currently,	  ethanol	  prices	  are	  very	  com-­‐petitive	  at	  gas	  stations,	  and	  consumption	  of	  ethanol	  is	  higher	  than	  pure	  gasoline.	  The	  firm	  structure	  has	  become	  more	  and	  more	  important;	  with	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions,	  there	  are	  almost	  30	  billion	  dollars	  in	  movement.	  	  	  
b.	  Bioenergy	  in	  Sweden:	  Narrative	  Responses	  
	  
Municipal	  Responses	  to	  the	  OPEC	  Oil	  Crisis	  The	  1973	  OPEC	  oil	  crisis	  prompted	  serious	  concerns	  in	  Sweden	  about	  the	  long-­‐term	  economic	  consequences	  of	  sustained	  high	  energy	  prices	  and	  the	  security	  implications	  of	  
	   8	  
sustained	  high	  levels	  of	  oil	  import	  dependence.	  Swedish	  leaders	  ultimately	  considered	  a	  transition	  to	  bioenergy	  a	  necessary	  and	  expedient	  solution	  to	  the	  country’s	  extensive	  use	  of	  oil	  for	  electricity	  and	  heat	  production,	  since	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Sweden’s	  municipalities	  al-­‐ready	  had	  both	  municipally	  owned	  electric	  utilities	  and	  district	  heating	  (DH)	  systems	  in	  place.	  	  Since	  most	  Swedish	  municipalities	  were	  also	  situated	  close	  to	  forests	  and	  related	  industries	  that	  produced	  abundant	  streams	  of	  biomass	  wastes	  (e.g.,	  logging	  operations,	  sawmills,	  and	  paper	  manufacturers),	  the	  switch	  from	  imported	  oil	  to	  domestic	  biomass	  as	  a	  boiler	  fuel	  was	  a	  relatively	  easy	  one.	  	  	  	  The	  first	  DH	  systems	  in	  Sweden	  dated	  to	  the	  1940s	  and	  were	  originally	  built	  both	  to	  provide	  heat	  for	  industrial	  processes	  and	  to	  alleviate	  the	  often	  severe	  air	  quality	  problems	  stemming	  from	  coal	  use	  and	  coking,	  that	  had	  plagued	  urban	  centers	  for	  decades.	  	  During	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  ease	  of	  fuel	  switching	  that	  DH	  systems	  facilitated	  was	  also	  considered	  a	  great	  advantage	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  insecurity	  of	  wartime.	  With	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  OPEC	  oil	  crisis	  and	  rising	  concerns	  about	  acid	  rain,	  the	  combination	  of	  established	  DH	  networks	  with	  domestic	  forest	  biomass	  fuels	  presented	  municipal	  governments	  across	  Sweden	  with	  a	  ready	  pathway	  to	  clean,	  secure,	  and	  affordable	  energy.	  	  The	  decentralized	  nature	  of	  Sweden’s	  political	  system	  also	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  country’s	  transition	  to	  bioenergy.	  Sweden’s	  288	  municipalities	  are	  relatively	  independ-­‐ent	  administrative	  and	  political	  units	  that	  collect	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  their	  respective	  budget	  revenues	  through	  taxes	  levied	  locally	  and	  exercise	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  administrative	  and	  political	  autonomy.	  As	  such,	  municipalities	  were	  the	  main	  drivers	  behind	  Sweden’s	  transition	  to	  the	  use	  of	  bioenergy,	  and	  the	  strategic	  alliances	  that	  municipalities	  formed	  with	  forest	  industry	  associations,	  sawmills,	  and	  the	  transportation	  industry	  played	  impor-­‐tant	  roles	  in	  facilitating	  the	  knowledge	  exchange	  and	  easy	  adoption	  of	  biofuel	  technologies.	  Municipal	  governments	  embraced	  biomass	  energy	  early	  on,	  recognizing	  that	  its	  adoption	  would	  keep	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  revenues	  within	  their	  respective	  administrative	  boundaries,	  creating	  jobs	  and	  spurring	  economic	  growth.	  	  Since	  all	  major	  domestic	  constituencies	  (i.e.,	  the	  forest,	  transportation,	  paper,	  and	  lumber	  industries,	  municipal	  and	  national	  govern-­‐ments,	  power	  producers	  and	  the	  general	  public)	  saw	  the	  transition	  to	  biofuels	  as	  advanta-­‐geous,	  no	  significant	  political	  obstacles	  impeded	  its	  progress.	  	  	  	  	  
Policy	  Drivers	  of	  Sustainable	  Bioenergy	  in	  Sweden	  As	  fossil	  energy	  prices	  fell	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  so	  did	  economic	  incentives	  for	  investment	  in	  alternative	  energy	  sources.	  By	  then,	  however,	  climate	  change	  concerns	  had	  emerged	  as	  a	  key	  driver	  behind	  the	  switch	  to	  biomass	  energy.	  	  To	  sustain	  both	  interest	  in	  and	  incentives	  for	  investment	  in	  bioenergy	  and	  other	  renewable	  energy	  sources,	  Sweden’s	  national	  government	  adopted	  two	  policies	  that	  have	  provided	  a	  stable	  regulatory	  environ-­‐ment	  for	  renewable	  energy:	  a	  tax	  on	  the	  carbon	  content	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  to	  equalize	  the	  rela-­‐tive	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  investing	  in	  fossil	  and	  renewable	  energy	  technologies	  and	  a	  Green	  Certificate	  (GC)	  program	  that	  required	  fossil	  power	  plants	  to	  purchase	  offsetting	  credits	  from	  non-­‐fossil	  energy	  producers.	  	  	  The	  Green	  Certificate	  program	  complemented	  the	  push	  effect	  of	  the	  carbon	  tax	  by	  cre-­‐ating	  a	  pull	  toward	  renewable	  energy	  generation	  and	  DH	  systems,	  since	  owners	  of	  wind,	  bioenergy,	  and	  other	  renewable	  electric	  plants	  received	  direct	  payments	  from	  electricity	  consumers.	  	  The	  program	  also	  provided	  government	  grants	  to	  assist	  companies	  and	  mu-­‐nicipal	  governments	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  renewable	  energy	  facilities.	  	  Following	  the	  institution	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of	  these	  two	  policies	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  bioenergy’s	  share	  of	  final	  energy	  use	  in	  Sweden	  more	  than	  doubled	  to	  approximately	  30	  percent	  by	  2009.	  	  Renewable	  energy	  now	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  60	  percent	  of	  Sweden’s	  primary	  energy	  supply.	  	  	  
c.	  United	  States	  Nuclear	  Power:	  Narrative	  Responses	  	  
Post-­World-­War-­II	  “Atoms	  for	  Peace”	  The	  demonstrated	  power	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  to	  kill	  wartime	  enemies	  gave	  way	  to	  a	  push	  for	  nuclear	  energy	  to	  make	  electricity,	  as	  articulated	  by	  President	  Eisenhower’s	  “Atoms	  for	  Peace”	  programs.	  	  There	  was	  a	  promise	  of	  electricity	  “too	  cheap	  to	  meter,”	  coupled	  with	  rising	  demand,	  which	  gave	  nuclear	  a	  luster	  –	  one	  respondent	  called	  this	  “magic”	  associated	  with	  the	  new	  technology.	  Participants	  agreed	  there	  was	  a	  very	  visible	  champion	  in	  Navy	  Admiral	  Hyman	  G.	  Rickover,	  who	  essentially	  chose	  the	  light	  water	  reactor.	  Electricity	  de-­‐mand	  was	  rising	  at	  6%	  or	  more	  per	  year,	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  this	  rate	  would	  go	  on	  indefinitely,	  and	  costs	  were	  expected	  to	  decline	  as	  companies	  gained	  experience	  with	  building	  nuclear	  plants.	  	  Despite	  the	  uncertainties	  abound,	  from	  technical	  to	  financial,	  the	  federal	  government	  gave	  the	  strongest	  possible	  support;	  massive	  government	  subsidies	  were	  very	  effective	  in	  the	  early	  years.	  The	  Atomic	  Energy	  Commission	  (AEC)	  (1946-­‐1974)	  regulated	  nuclear	  energy,	  working	  with	  the	  congressional	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  Atomic	  En-­‐ergy	  to	  devise	  processes	  for	  siting,	  waste	  management,	  and	  research	  and	  development	  –	  all	  essential	  to	  the	  industry’s	  development.	  	  
The	  Rapid	  Expansion	  of	  Nuclear	  Power	  Until	  the	  late	  1960s,	  nuclear	  power	  became	  an	  increasingly	  important	  part	  of	  meeting	  the	  overall	  energy	  demand	  growth.	  The	  Price-­‐Anderson	  Act	  (1957)	  and	  other	  regulations	  minimized	  the	  financial	  risks	  of	  building	  nuclear	  plants,	  firms	  were	  eager	  to	  build,	  and	  costs	  declined	  as	  bigger	  generators	  were	  built.	  In	  addition,	  concerns	  about	  the	  environ-­‐mental	  impact	  of	  coal	  burning	  led	  to	  a	  reluctance	  to	  build	  coal-­‐fired	  plants	  until	  uncertain-­‐ties	  about	  regulation	  were	  settled.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  US	  government	  was	  in	  the	  business	  of	  funding	  new	  technologies,	  from	  development	  through	  deployment.	  Many	  plants	  were	  built	  while	  regulations	  were	  evolving,	  and	  the	  AEC	  operated	  fairly	  independently.	  Utilities	  had	  a	  felt	  mission	  to	  serve	  rising	  demand,	  and	  construction	  firms	  took	  pride	  in	  being	  part	  of	  the	  nuclear	  expansion.	  	  
Curtailment	  In	  the	  1970s,	  anti-­‐nuclear	  forces,	  always	  present	  as	  a	  deep	  distrust	  of	  the	  military	  foundations	  of	  nuclear	  as	  well	  as	  environmental	  concerns,	  increased	  their	  activities	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  economic	  downturns,	  rising	  energy	  costs,	  and	  lower	  demand	  made	  nuclear	  power	  less	  attractive.	  The	  1979	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  accident	  was	  a	  visible	  “break	  point”	  for	  nuclear,	  but	  the	  conditions	  of	  change	  were	  already	  present	  before	  this	  accident.	  	  
d.	  Sweden	  Nuclear	  Power:	  Narrative	  Responses	  	  
Military	  Beginnings	  The	  Swedish	  nuclear	  program	  –	  as	  one	  interview	  respondent	  put	  it	  –	  all	  started	  in	  1945	  when	  a	  US	  delegation	  made	  an	  unannounced	  visit	  to	  Sweden	  to	  look	  at	  the	  uranium	  depos-­‐
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its,	  which,	  while	  of	  poor	  quality,	  were	  some	  of	  the	  largest	  in	  Europe.	  Sweden	  did	  not	  end	  up	  doing	  business	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  Swedish	  government	  re-­‐alized	  that	  nuclear	  weapons	  were	  the	  weapons	  of	  the	  future,	  and	  the	  country	  desired	  an	  effective	  deterrent	  weapon	  as	  it	  sat	  neutral	  between	  NATO	  and	  Russia.	  	  It	  was	  quickly	  real-­‐ized	  that	  Sweden	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  develop	  such	  nuclear	  weapons	  through	  heavy	  water	  reactor	  projects	  that	  could	  produce	  weapons	  grade	  material.	  	  The	  government	  founded	  Atomenergi,	  a	  state-­‐owned	  nuclear	  research	  company,	  to	  run	  a	  research	  center	  in	  Studsvik	  and	  develop	  nuclear	  reactor	  and	  weapons	  technology.	  And	  in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  Atomenergi	  and	  Vattenfall,	  the	  state-­‐owned	  utility,	  designed	  and	  built	  the	  first	  heavy	  water	  reactor	  demonstration	  plant	  in	  Agesta,	  which	  started	  up	  in	  1963.	  Surpris-­‐ingly,	  the	  technology	  was	  developed	  independently,	  as	  opposed	  to	  getting	  a	  license	  from	  a	  country	  like	  the	  United	  States	  that	  had	  already	  developed	  its	  nuclear	  program.	  Agesta	  suc-­‐cessfully	  produced	  electricity	  and	  could	  put	  out	  small	  amounts	  of	  weapons	  material,	  but	  it	  was	  considered	  too	  small.	  A	  plant	  in	  Marviken	  followed,	  but	  the	  ambitious	  design	  made	  it	  too	  unstable	  for	  start	  up.	  It	  was	  never	  completed	  but	  turned	  into	  an	  oil-­‐fired	  generation	  plant.	  But	  by	  that	  time,	  in	  late	  1960s,	  support	  and	  need	  for	  a	  nuclear	  weapons	  program	  had	  dwindled	  and	  officially	  ended	  when	  Sweden	  signed	  the	  Nuclear	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  Treaty	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.	  	  
The	  Nuclear	  Build-­out	  After	  WWII,	  hydropower	  propelled	  Sweden	  into	  an	  industrial	  revolution,	  quickly	  sur-­‐passing	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  in	  GDP	  per	  capita	  by	  1970.	  The	  country	  saw	  a	  three	  percent	  eco-­‐nomic	  growth	  per	  year	  and	  an	  increased	  quality	  of	  life,	  but	  the	  government	  realized	  that	  they	  were	  running	  out	  of	  rivers.	  Coal-­‐	  and	  oil-­‐fired	  power	  plants	  became	  an	  option,	  but	  the	  environmental	  impacts	  were	  quickly	  seen	  as	  unacceptable.	  Energy	  independence	  also	  be-­‐came	  more	  important,	  especially	  with	  the	  oil	  crises	  occurring	  during	  that	  time.	  Nuclear	  power	  became	  the	  obvious	  choice,	  especially	  since	  the	  large	  base	  loads	  already	  fit	  into	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  electricity	  provision	  and	  distribution	  systems	  under	  the	  large-­‐scale	  centralized	  production	  of	  hydropower.	  The	  government,	  specifically	  under	  Prime	  Minister	  Tage	  Er-­‐lander,	  spent	  much	  money	  in	  research	  and	  development	  on	  heavy	  water	  reactors	  through	  Atomenergi	  in	  Studsvik.	  	  At	  that	  time,	  however,	  private	  companies	  started	  to	  complain	  about	  the	  government’s	  monopolistic	  reign	  on	  nuclear	  power.	  Asea,	  an	  electrical	  engineering	  company	  led	  by	  Curt	  Nicolin,	  took	  the	  risk	  to	  develop	  its	  own	  light	  water	  reactor	  technology,	  again	  without	  a	  li-­‐cense.	  Asea	  had	  previously	  worked	  many	  hydropower	  projects	  and	  was	  also	  a	  subcontrac-­‐tor	  on	  the	  Marviken	  plant.	  And	  in	  1965,	  Asea	  signed	  a	  contract	  Vattenfall	  to	  build	  Oskar-­‐shamn	  Unit	  One,	  which	  came	  on	  the	  grid	  in	  1972.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  the	  government-­‐owned	  Atomenergi	  forced	  a	  merger	  with	  Asea,	  becoming	  Asea	  Atom,	  a	  100	  percent	  civil	  company.	  Together	  with	  Vattenfall,	  and	  a	  large	  cadre	  of	  newly-­‐trained	  nuclear	  engineers	  coming	  out	  of	  just	  a	  few	  universities,	  12	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  were	  built	  and	  operated	  in	  Sweden	  over	  the	  next	  decade.	  	  
The	  Growth	  of	  Anti-­Nuclear	  Sentiment	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  the	  political	  tone	  had	  changed	  in	  Sweden,	  challenging	  the	  safety	  and	  impact	  of	  nuclear	  technology.	  The	  four-­‐decade	  reign	  of	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  party	  ended	  when	  the	  Centre	  Party	  gained	  control	  in	  Parliament.	  Its	  leader,	  Gunnar	  Hed-­‐
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lund	  and	  his	  advisor,	  physicist	  and	  Nobel	  Laureate	  Hannes	  Alfvén,	  thought	  nuclear	  power	  to	  be	  extremely	  dangerous.	  The	  advent	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement,	  Rachel	  Carson’s	  book,	  and	  the	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  nuclear	  accident	  in	  1979	  culminated	  in	  a	  moratorium	  on	  construction	  and	  a	  public	  referendum	  on	  nuclear	  in	  1980,	  resulting	  in	  a	  request	  to	  phase	  out	  nuclear	  by	  2010.	  	  As	  the	  century	  came	  to	  a	  close,	  pressure	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  government	  by	  citizens	  and	  other	  countries	  to	  close	  two	  reactors	  in	  Barsebäck,	  which	  eventually	  happened	  in	  1997.	  The	  deal,	  however,	  came	  with	  an	  informal	  agreement	  that	  the	  2010	  phase	  out	  was	  no	  longer	  required.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  government	  could	  continue,	  and	  has	  to	  this	  day,	  up-­‐grading	  the	  reactor	  units	  in	  the	  existing	  plants,	  extending	  their	  life	  to	  55	  or	  even	  60	  years.	  For	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  nuclear	  power	  will	  remain	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  Swedish	  power	  grid.	  Issues	  of	  safety	  and	  waste,	  especially,	  remain.	  Companies	  like	  SKB,	  were	  created	  to	  deal	  with	  waste	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  will	  ensure	  future	  safety	  for	  Sweden,	  its	  citizen,	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  
Discussion	  	  	  The	  responses	  for	  part	  two	  of	  the	  interviews	  are	  outlined	  in	  Table	  2.	  This	  portion	  of	  the	  interview	  protocol	  asked	  participants	  to	  select,	  from	  a	  group	  of	  nine	  options,	  the	  fac-­‐tor(s)	  they	  considered	  most	  important	  in	  influencing	  the	  direction	  of	  technological	  change	  in	  their	  sector.	  Figure	  1	  depicts	  the	  same	  data	  but	  instead	  as	  a	  fraction	  of	  total	  responses	  in	  that	  country-­‐sector	  combination,	  allows	  for	  easier	  intercomparison	  among	  cases	  of	  differ-­‐ent	  Ns.	  As	  evident	  from	  Figure	  1,	  a	  high	  fraction	  of	  participants,	  in	  all	  cases,	  emphasized	  domestic	  policy	  as	  a	  strong	  determinant	  in	  the	  diffusion	  (or	  lack	  of	  diffusion)	  of	  the	  two	  major	  energy	  technologies.	  For	  this	  category,	  at	  least	  70%	  of	  all	  participants	  in	  every	  case	  ranked	  it	  as	  a	  top	  factor.	  All	  participants	  in	  Nuclear-­‐US	  (N=6)	  and	  Bioenergy-­‐Brazil	  (N=12)	  named	  this	  as	  a	  top	  factor;	  over	  80%	  of	  Nuclear-­‐Sweden	  participants	  (N=7)	  also	  named	  it.	  Technological	  characteristics	  were	  identified	  as	  an	  important	  factor	  by	  greater	  than	  80%	  of	  participants	  in	  2	  of	  4	  cases	  (again,	  Nuclear-­‐US	  and	  Bioenergy-­‐Brazil).	  Sector	  characteristics,	  Corporate	  culture,	  and	  Regulation	  were	  identified	  by	  more	  than	  40%	  of	  participants	  in	  2,	  3,	  and	  2	  cases,	  respectively.	  Interestingly,	  Regulation	  was	  named	  relatively	  frequently	  (>80%,	  N=6)	  for	  Nuclear-­‐US,	  but	  the	  other	  sectors	  did	  not	  mention	  this	  factor	  as	  frequently.	  	   	  	  
Table	  2.	   Participants’	   assessments	  of	   the	   “most	   important”	  or	   “determina-­‐tive”	  factors	  behind	  the	  technological	  transformations	  in	  the	  nuclear/bioenergy	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Figure	  1.	  Fraction	  of	  responses	  by	  participants	  indicating	  that	  each	  fac-­‐tor	  is	  “very	  important”	  or	  “determinative”,	  grouped	  by	  factor.	  Total	  number	  of	  interviewees	  is	  36,	  and	  N	  for	  individual	  cases	  is	  given	  in	  Table 2	  
	  
	  Individual	  cases	  had	  noteworthy	  variations	  as	  well.	  Figure	  2	  clusters	  the	  responses	  across	  to	  the	  four	  individual	  cases.	  Bioenergy-­‐Brazil	  presents	  perhaps	  the	  most	  dramatic	  illustration	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  non-­‐economic	  factors,	  with	  fully	  12/12	  participants	  rank-­‐ing	  domestic	  policy	  and	  10/12	  identifying	  technological	  characteristics	  of	  ethanol	  as	  a	  very	  important	  factor.	  Bioenergy-­‐Sweden	  also	  showed	  emphasis	  on	  those	  two	  factors,	  but	  their	  importance	  was	  not	  as	  exaggerated	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  factors	  (Sector	  characteristics,	  Corporate	  culture,	  and	  Regulation).	  The	  Nuclear-­‐US	  case	  participants	  emphasized	  Domestic	  policy,	  Technological	  characteristics,	  and	  Regulation.	  Domestic	  Policy	  was	  a	  more	  pro-­‐nounced	  point	  of	  agreement	  in	  the	  Nuclear-­‐Sweden	  case,	  with	  other	  factors	  lacking	  strong	  consensus.	  The	  Bioenergy-­‐Sweden	  case	  also	  saw	  a	  substantially	  greater	  response	  for	  Do-­‐mestic	  Policy.	  Perhaps	  most	  noteworthy,	  however,	  was	  that	  the	  largest	  fraction	  of	  partici-­‐pants	  across	  all	  cases	  identified	  Domestic	  Policy	  as	  a	  very	  important	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  trajectory	  of	  their	  technology.	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Figure	  2.	  Fraction	  of	  responses	  by	  participants	  indicating	  that	  each	  fac-­‐tor	  is	  “very	  important”	  or	  “determinative”,	  grouped	  by	  case	  (country/sector).	  Total	   number	   of	   interviewees	   is	   36,	   and	   N	   for	   individual	   cases	   is	   given	   in	  
Table 2.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	   In	  summary,	  this	  paper	  presents	  results	  from	  four	  cases	  in	  which	  low-­‐carbon	  energy	  technologies	  experienced	  a	  substantial	  growth	  in	  the	  past	  50	  years:	  Bioenergy	  in	  Sweden	  and	  Brazil,	  and	  Nuclear	  Power	  in	  Sweden	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Through	  interviews	  with	  key	  participants	  and	  experts,	  we	  traced	  not	  only	  the	  history	  of	  each	  technology	  in	  each	  country	  but	  also	  asked	  participants	  to	  select	  the	  factors	  they	  deemed	  most	  important	  in	  that	  technological	  trajectory.	  	  Across	  both	  technologies	  and	  all	  three	  countries,	  “domestic	  politics,	  preferences,	  and	  policy”	  was	  identified	  as	  a	  very	  important	  factor	  by	  the	  largest	  fraction	  of	  participants.	  With	  some	  variation	  across	  cases,	  “Technological	  characteristics”	  was	  also	  identified	  as	  a	  very	  important	  factor.	  A	  smaller	  fraction	  of	  participants	  in	  all	  cases	  identified	  “sector	  characteristics”	  and	  “regulation”	  as	  very	  important	  factors.	  Factors	  that	  were	  not	  mentioned	  frequently	  include	  “international	  policy,”	  “firm	  structure,”	  and	  “firm	  decisionmaking	  characteristics.”	  	  These	  results,	  combined	  with	  the	  narrative	  histories	  assembled	  for	  each	  country-­‐sector	  case,	  illustrate	  the	  large	  degree	  to	  which	  major	  energy	  technology	  transformations	  are	  de-­‐pendent	  on	  non-­‐economic	  factors.	  While	  we	  can	  certainly	  acknowledge	  that	  pricing	  exter-­‐nalities	  properly	  may	  drive	  economies	  toward	  a	  lower-­‐carbon	  economy,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  such	  policies	  are	  either	  forthcoming	  or	  feasible	  across	  a	  wide	  swath	  of	  the	  global	  econ-­‐omy.	  Indeed,	  for	  the	  cases	  we	  present	  here,	  externality	  pricing	  was	  a	  following,	  and	  not	  a	  leading	  factor,	  to	  technological	  changes.	  Instead,	  the	  changes	  occurred	  as	  part	  of	  domestic	  policy	  that	  was	  targeting	  goals	  such	  as	  domestic	  economic	  competitiveness,	  energy	  secu-­‐rity,	  and	  respect	  for	  existing	  industries.	  As	  such,	  understanding	  these	  factors	  better,	  and	  how	  best	  to	  influence	  them,	  may	  be	  a	  more	  productive	  path	  to	  emissions	  reduction	  than	  focusing	  on	  pricing	  mechanisms.	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Appendix:	  Description	  of	  Factors	  
	  	  	  




Firm's willingness to 
take risks on technol-
ogy 
Is your firm generally 
more risk-averse or risk-
taking about technology 
decisions? 
Willingness to take 
technological risks 
Heymann 1988, Rogers 1995, 
Kemp & Volpi 2008, Rotem-
berg & Salomer 2000, Shapira 
1994, Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Dosi 1988, Tidd et al. 1997, 
Petts et al. 1998, Andrews 
1998, Kline & Rosenberg 
1986, Utterback 1994, van 
Someren 1995, Chattery 1995 
 Firm's attitude toward 
adopting the technol-
ogy  
Why did your firm adopt 
or not when it did? 
Attitudes toward adopt-
ing the technology  
Montalvo 2006 & 2008 
 Firm's confidence 
about adopting the 
technology  
How easy did your firm 
think it would be to im-






Ajzen 1991, Montalvo 2006 
Corporate cul-
ture 
Whether firm adopted 
the technology early or 
late compared to other 
firms 
How many firms in your 
country had already 
adopted nuclear/ethanol 
technology? 
Whether firm was an 
early or late adopter  
Nelson 1981, Stoneman & 
Diederen 1994, Grübler 1997, 
Malone 2003 [book] 
 Leadership at the firm How important was indi-
vidual leadership or man-
agement in the develop-
ment or implementation of 
nuclear/ethanol technol-
ogy at your firm? 
Leadership factors  
 Presence of a cham-
pion for the technology 
at the firm 
Was there a champion for 
nuclear/ethanol technol-
ogy within your firm? 
Presence of a cham-
pion/charismatic lead-
ership  
Rosenberg 1982 [book], 
Malone & Runci [no digital] 
 Consistency and qual-
ity of leadership in 
support of the technol-
ogy at the firm 
Was there strong and 
consistent leadership on 
nuclear/ethanol technol-
ogy within your firm? 
Degree, stability and 
wisdom of administra-
tive sponsorship  
Nonaka & Peltokorpi 2006 
[book], Montalvo 2008, Carr 
[no digital] 
 Improvement of man-
agement at the firm 
Did management at your 





Malone 2004 [no digital] 
 Firm's organizational 
and technical capabili-
ties 
How much expertise, 
training/capacity, and 
experience did your firm 




technical capabilities of 
the firm 
Moreira & Goldemberg 1999, 
Montalvo 2008, Lin et al. 2009, 
Penrose 1959, Collins 1994, 
Collins et al. 1988, Leonard-
Barton 1992, Rosenbloom and 
Christensen 1994, Teece and 
Pisano 1994, Teece et al. 
1990, Panda and Ramanathan 
1996, Grant 1996 
 Application of prior 
knowledge to the tech-
nology 
Did your firm's knowledge 
about another technology 
aid in the implementation 
of this technology? 
Knowledge spillovers Argote & Epple 1990, Malone 
2003 [book], Nonaka & Pelto-
korpi 2006 [book] 
 Information flow How would you characterize information dissemination and cross-departmental com-
munication? 
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 Labor relations How important were 
workforce concerns or 
labor relations in the de-
velopment or implementa-
tion of nuclear/ethanol 
technology? 
Labor-related factors Hughes 1983 [book] 
 Firm's contractual 
commitments to a par-
ticular technology 
Was your firm already 
contractually committed 
to any particular technol-
ogy? 
Contractual commit-






Size of the firm How large is your firm 
relative to other firms in 
your sector? 
Firm size Constant 1987 [book], Rose & 
Joskow 1990 
 Firm's existing capital 
and infrastructure and 
their compatibility with 
the technology 
How compatible was 
existing infrastructure with 
the new nuclear/ethanol 
technology? 
Existing capital and 
infrastructure: turnover 
and compatibility  
Stoneman & Diederen 1994, 
Grübler 1997, Walker 2000, 
Malone 2003 [book], Malone 
2004 [no digital], Kemp & Volpi 
2008 




What is the ownership 




Ownership structure  Constant 1987 [book], Rose & 
Joskow 1990 
 Amount of R&D con-
ducted at the firm  
How much technology 
R&D does your firm en-
gage in? 
R&D  Stoneman & Diederen 1994 
 Firm's investment in 
improving capital and 
processes 
How much improve-
ment/investment in capital 
goods and processes 
does your firm make? 
Technological progress 
in capital goods and 
processes 
Dutton & Thomas 1984 
 Firm's existing physical 
capacity for clean 
technologies 
Did your firm already 
have an environmental 
management systems or 
had it made any other 
similar investments? 
Absorptive capacity 
(physical) for clean 
technologies 
Kemp & Volpi 2008 
Characteristics 
of sector 
Alliances among firms 
within the sector 
Are the firms in your sec-
tor very networked, i.e. 
are there alliances and 
cooperation? 
Presence of strategic 
alliances and networks 
Nelson 1981, Lin et al. 2009 
 Knowledge sharing 
among firms within the 
sector 
How much do firms within 
your sector share infor-
mation? 
Knowledge spillover among firms 
 Knowledge sharing 
between the sector and 
other sectors 
How much does your 
sector share information 
with other sectors? 
Knowledge spillover 
among sectors 
Rosenberg 1994 [book] 
 Whether country 
adopted the technology 
early or late compared 
to other countries 
Did your country adopt 
nuclear/ethanol technol-
ogy late or early relative 
to other countries? 
Whether market is an 
early or late adopter  
Grübler 1997, Malone 2003 
[book] 
 Size of the existing 
energy system before 
the technology 
How large was the exist-
ing energy system before 
implementation of nu-
clear/ethanol technology? 
Extent of energy sys-
tem 
Grübler 1997 
 Fragmentation or mo-
nopoly within the sector 
Is your industry character-
ized by either fragmenta-
tion or monopoly? 





Public support and 
preferences 






Pickett 2002, Malone 2003 
[book], Jacobsson & Lauber 
2006, Runci, Clarke, & Dooley 
2006, Montalvo 2006 & 2008, 
Howard et al. 2009 [no digital], 
Malone & Runci [no digital] 
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 Shareholder support 
and preferences 






Montalvo 2006 & 2008 
 Political support and 
preferences 
Was there support from 
political leaders for nu-
clear/ethanol technology? 
Political sup-
port/commitments to a 
particular technology  
Walker 2000, Jacobsson & 
Lauber 2006, Howard et al. 
2009, Nemet 2009, Malone & 
Runci [no digital] 
 Relationship with gov-
ernment  
Does your firm have a 






 Government R&D Is there much govern-
ment-sponsored R&D of 
nuclear/ethanol technol-
ogy? 
Government R&D Astrand & Neij 2006, Foster, 
Hildén, & Adler 2006, Ja-
cobsson & Lauber 2006, 
Runci, Clarke, & Dooley 2006, 
Lin et al. 2009, Nemet 2009 
 Government-
sponsored conferences 
and technical support 
Does the government 
sponsor conferences on 
nuclear/ethanol technol-
ogy or provide other 





Taylor, Rubin, & Hounshell 
2003 
 National pride To what extent was the 
choice of ethanol/nuclear 
technology related to 
perceptions of national 
prestige, strength, and 
cohesion? 
Nationalism Kovarik 2007 
 National security bene-
fits from the technology 
Is nuclear/ethanol tech-
nology perceived as 
linked to increased na-
tional security? 
National security Pickett 2002, Astrand & Neij 
2006, Kovarik 2007 
 Presence or absence 
of a domestic policy 
encouraging the tech-
nology 
Was there a domestic 
policy in place encourag-
ing adoption of nu-
clear/ethanol technology? 
Presence or absence 
of domestic policy 
Lesbirel 1990 [no digital], 
Stoneman & Diederen 1994, 
Moreira & Goldemberg 1999, 
Astrand & Neij 2006, Ja-
cobsson & Lauber 2006, Mon-
talvo 2008, Kemp & Volpi 
2008, Malone & Runci [no 
digital] 
Regulation Presence or absence 
of a policy regulating 
the technology 
Were there standards or 
a policy in place regulat-
ing nuclear/ethanol tech-
nology? 
Regulatory pressure Rosenberg 1969, Taylor, Ru-
bin, & Hounshell 2003, Foster, 
Hildén, & Adler 2006 [book], 
Montalvo 2006, Kemp & Volpi 
2008 




mental policies and regu-




Brown et al. 2007, Nemet 2009 
 Resistance to technol-
ogy change from 
sources outside the 
firm 
How much resistance to 
technology change was 
there from different ac-
tors, institutions, and the 
economic and political 
systems? 
Degree of conservative 
momentum in socio-
technical systems  
Hughes 1983 [book], Grübler 
1997, Astrand & Neij 2006, 






tional community and 
international markets  







tics and markets) 
Pickett 2002 
 Risk of sanctions Was there a risk of sanc-
tions from the interna-
tional community for im-
plementing nu-
clear/ethanol technology? 
Risk of sanctions  
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 Presence or absence 
of an international 
policy encouraging the 
technology 
Was there an interna-
tional policy in place en-
couraging adoption of 
nuclear/ethanol technol-
ogy? 
Presence or absence of international policy 
Technological 
characteristics 
Gains in efficiency or 
quality, cost reductions, 
or environmental bene-
fits from technology 




e.g. efficiency, quality, 





Klevorick et al. 1995, Montalvo 
2008, [Maybe (from Nemet 
2009): Rosenberg 1974, Nel-
son and Winter 1977] 
 Number of competing 
types/designs of the 
technologies to choose 
from 
Were there competing 
types of nuclear/ethanol 
technology to choose 
from? 
Number of competing 
technologies/diversity 
of designs 
Grübler 1997, Malone 2003 
[book], Nemet 2009 
 Availability of informa-
tion on the technology 




tion on technology 
Nelson 1981, Soete & Turner 
1984, Stoneman & Diederen 
1994, Kemp & Volpi 2008 
 Time and cost to learn 
how to use new tech-
nology  
Was learning to use nu-
clear/ethanol technology 
very time and cost inten-
sive? 
Time and cost to learn 
how to use new tech-
nology  
Soete & Turner 1984 
 Intellectual property 
barriers to using the 
technology 
Were there any intellec-
tual property barriers to 




Soete & Turner 1984, Brown et 
al. 2007 
 Compatibility of tech-





ture were available to 




Rosenberg 1982 [book], 
Grübler 1997, Malone 2003 
[book], Kemp & Volpi 2008 
 Environmental prob-
lems or benefits related 
to the technology 
Does nuclear/energy 










Special conditions that 
enabled adoption of the 
technology 
Were there any specific 
initial conditions that you 





Rosenberg 1982 [book], 
Grübler 1997 
	  	  
